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Twenty Years’ Evolution of North Korean Migration,
1994–2014: A Human Security Perspective
Jiyoung Song*
Abstract
Over the past two decades, there have been
notable changes in North Korean migration:
from forced migration to trafficking in women,
from heroic underground railways to people
smuggling by Christian missionaries. The
migration has taken mixed forms of asylum
seeking, human trafficking, undocumented
labour migration and people smuggling. The
paper follows the footsteps of North Korean
migrants from China through Southeast Asia to
South Korea, and from there to the United
Kingdom, to see the dynamic correlation
between human (in)security and irregular
migration. It analyses how individual
migrant’s agency interacts with other key
actors in the migration system and eventually
brings about emerging patterns of four distinc-
tive forms of irregular migration in a macro
level. It uses human security as its conceptual
framework that is a people-centred, rather than
state- or national security-centric approach to
irregular migration.
Key words: North Korea, migration, human
trafficking, people smuggling, human security
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, there have been
notable changes in North Korean migration:
from forced migration in search of freedom to
economic or environmental refugees, caused by
famine and natural disasters, from trafficking in
women to undocumented sex work in Karaoke
bars, or from heroic underground railways to
people smuggling by Christian missionaries.
When the author first began her research on
North Korean asylum seekers in China in 1999,
many North Koreans fell squarely under the
category of victims of the politically repressive
regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), its human rights violations,
closed economy, the series of natural disasters,
and subsequent famine and malnutrition. The
motivations of their defection were mixed:
political, social, economic and environmental.
Fifteen years later, the author’s team inter-
viewed dozens of North Koreans who were
living in the United Kingdom, as British citi-
zens or permanent residents who are no longer
categorised as victims but rather autonomous
agents of their own who navigate the best places
to live not just for their own survival but also for
reproduction.
The article first outlines the journey of
North Korean migrants from China to investi-
gate the initial forms and motivations of North
Korean irregular migration and to identify the
main human security concerns in these pecu-
liar forms of mixed migration. Second, in
Southeast Asia, it focuses on the consequences
and human cost of diverse geopolitical envi-
ronments to which North Korean migrants are
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exposed and adapt to, guided by brokers and
missionaries. Affected people’s (Kempadoo
et al. 2005) vulnerability and potential human
rights violations are the subject of inquiry.
Third, in South Korea, North Koreans’ legal
and social identities and why their dual nation-
ality drives secondary migration to the Western
world will be analysed. Finally, the article
introduces some of the challenges North
Korean asylum seekers and refugees face in
the United Kingdom based on a series of inter-
views conducted in 2012–2014.
The conceptual framework of this article is
human security, a people-centred, rather than
state- or national security-centric, perspective
that helps us understand the non-linearity of
migration patterns. Before the article moves
into the empirical analysis, the human security
framework will be explained below.
2. Human Security: Securitisation of
Human Rights
Human security, a concept endorsed by the
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and theorised upon by a few scholars
of international relations, has slowly gained
currency in public discourse but is still not
widely accepted in the academic circle.
Mahbub ul Haq, Pakistani economist and
author of the Human Development Report,
categorised the seven pillars of human security
in 1994, which, I argue, are all within the
realm of international human rights as follows:
• Personal Security: the right to life, liberty
and security; not to be discriminated against
on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, reli-
gion, sex, political opinion or social origin,
birth, disability, gender, sexual orientation; to
freedom from violence, torture, slavery,
exploitation, arbitrary arrest, or summary
execution; to recognition before the law,
fair trial, privacy, family, property, identity/
nationality, movement and residence, gender
equality, freedom of thought and education
(Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) Articles 1–19, 26; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) Articles 2–3, 6–20, 23–4, 26; Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Articles 2–3, 10,
13–4; Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW); Convention of the Rights of the
Child (CRC); Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and other
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
conventions on forced labour or child labour)
• Community Security: the right to cultural life;
to preserve cultural practices, values or heri-
tage from sectarian violence or not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race,
ethnicity, nationality or religion (UDHR
Article 27; ICCPR Article 27; ICESCR
Article 15; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (CERD); and International Conven-
tion on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families (MWC))
• Political Security: the rights to freedom of
assembly, political participation; not to be
discriminated against based on political
opinion; to vote, to stand for election, to have
free and fair elections, to freedom
of speech, to form and maintain political
organisations, or to organise social move-
ments (UDHR Articles 2, 20–21; ICCPR
Articles 21–22, 25)
• Economic Security: the rights to basic
income, to social security, work, rest, to par-
ticipate in trade unions (UDHR Article 22–4;
ICESCRArticles 6–9; and other ILO conven-
tions on minimum wage, etc.)
• Food Security: the rights to an adequate stan-
dard of living, to freedom from hunger, to
access to basic food (ICESCR Articles 11)
• Heath Security: the rights to a decent stan-
dard of living, to health, to protection from
infectious or chronic diseases and to access
health services (UDHR Article 25; ICESCR
Articles 12)
• Environment Security: the rights to an
adequate standard of living, clothing,
housing, a clean environment, especially
water and air, and to be protected from man-
made environmental disasters (ICESCR
Articles 11)
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The UN Commission on Human Security,
established in 2001, has been renamed to the
Human Security Unit under the Office of the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in 2004.
Its activities are meagre, not because of the lack
of utility in the concept of human security but
because of the institutional overlaps on its
redundant mandates within the UN system. To
name a few, the UNDP has broad mandates on
human development, the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights on human
rights, The UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees on armed conflicts/human security and
refugees, the UN Education, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organisation on cultural security, the UN
Office of Drugs and Crime on personal security
and transnational crimes, the International
Organisation for Migration on human security
and migrants, and the International Labour
Organisation on economic security and labour
rights.
Since the 1994 UNDP Report, the notions of
personal, cultural or environmental security
have emerged and the state-centric national
defence security concepts have been chal-
lenged by many scholars (Thomas 1987;
Wiberg 1992; Buzan 1993; Jones 1995; Wæver
1995; Baldwin 1997; Krause & Williams 1997;
Poku & Graham 1998). Many East Asian elites
are receptive to the idea of human security. The
Japanese government, the Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji and the ASEAN Secretary-General
Surin Pitsuwan endorsed human security as a
comprehensive security concept (on the Asian
conception of human security, see Alagappa
1988; Matsumae & Chen 1995; Tow et al. 2000;
Thiparat 2001; Bajpai 2003).
Human security is a more appropriate con-
ceptual framework to understand the causes
and motivations of irregular migration and also
a concept that captures the urgency of extra-
legal and extra-political measures through
international cooperation and the paramount
importance of detrimental human costs.
Human security is also complex in that one set
of mixed human insecurities become the cause
of one irregular migrant’s motivation to leave
and, because of the act of leaving and the
irregular status of migrants, it creates another
set of human insecurities. In spite of harsh
realities of human insecurities, many irregular
migrants self-organise to survive. Complex
networks of key actors, each with his/her own
interests, facilitate irregular migration.
For this study of North Korean irregular
migrants in four different locations and migra-
tory regimes, primary sources of in-depth
interviews and focus-group discussions as well
as secondary data from non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) are used to generate and
validate stories of migration. The author has
interviewed North Koreans in China and South
Korea since 1999. In 2012–2014, she gathered
additional data from 85 new sources of North
Koreans who became South Koreans and
asylum seekers or refugees in the United
Kingdom, focusing on new arrivals in Seoul
and the United Kingdom since 2004. Among
them, the main target interviewees were five
former and current brokers/smugglers/guides
who ‘helped’ migrate North Koreans from one
location to another and who could reveal the
detailed migratory routes and main attractors
for migration.
3. ‘Bare Life’ in China
No official data is available on how many
North Koreans live in the Republic of China
(PRC). In the early 2000s, the PRC govern-
ment’s estimation is around 10,000–50,000;
the ROK at 30,000–50,000; the US State
Department at 75,000–125,000; the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) at 50,000–100,000; and NGOs at
100,000–300,000 (Lee 2001–2002, 2004;
Lohman 1996; Seymour 2005).
The lives of North Korean irregular
migrants in China can be aptly captured by
Giogio Agamben’s (1998) concept of ‘bare
life’, a life that is not ‘simply set outside the
law and made indifferent to it but is rather
abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threat-
ened on the threshold in which life and law,
outside and inside, become indistinguishable’.
Judith Butler (2004) further expands and
concretises Agamben’s idea by proposing that
we need to see ‘how this power functions dif-
ferently, to target and manage certain popula-
tions, to de-realize the humanity of subjects
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who might potentially belong to community
bound by commonly recognised laws’.
Agamben (1998) defines those with ‘bare life’
the ones without either being granted residen-
tial status or being deported homo sacer
(sacred man) as they ‘may be killed and yet not
sacrificed’, which succinctly describes the
lives of North Koreans in China.
North Koreans leave their homes for mixed
reasons and, as a result of their irregular migra-
tion, the situation North Koreans face in China
is grim. Both push and pull factors of famine
and political repression in the North and
food, employment, relative freedom and infor-
mation in China set the exogenous environ-
ments for their irregular migration. The North
Korean authority does not allow freedom of
movement and sporadically restricts cross-
border movements. The system itself creates
migrants with irregular status. Many women,
who make up 75 per cent of North Koreans
who arrived in the ROK since 2006, are victims
of forced marriages or sexual exploitation in
China (Human Rights Watch 2002, Good
Friends 2004, Anti-Slavery International 2005,
Seymour 2005, Davis 2006, International
Crisis Group 2006, Congressional Research
Service 2007, Human Rights Watch 2008,
HumanTrafficking.org 2008, Lagon 2008,
Butler 2009, Committee for Human Rights in
North Korea 2009, North Korea Now 2010,
Park et al. 2010, United States Department of
State 2010, Coalition Against Trafficking in
Women 2011, Kim 2011).As soon as they leave
North Korea, their illegal status in China makes
them highly vulnerable to physical abuse or
sexual exploitation, putting their personal secu-
rity under great danger. North Koreans as a
single ethnic community are targeted because
of the bilateral agreement between the PRC and
the DPRK that allows the Chinese authorities to
repatriate North Koreans back to where they
face severe persecution.
Their precarious legal status leads to another
set of threats to North Koreans’ political and
economic securities. North Koreans cannot
participate in any civic activities including the
birth registration of their half-Chinese children
and earn basic income to survive. Their
restricted movements do not allow them access
to work, basic food, health care or clean envi-
ronment. They live in secret shelters and hide
from the authorities. The only way they are
provided with food and shelter is through local
Chinese, underground Christian missionaries
or aid workers whose acts are considered illegal
in China. North Koreans are therefore victims
of the two repressive regimes of the DPRK and
the PRC.
The PRC authority presents an erratic and
inconsistent policy towards North Korean
migrants in China. It does not recognise North
Koreans as refugees and prioritises the bilateral
agreement with North Korea over its interna-
tional obligation of non-refoulement under the
1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees (hereafter Refugee Convention) to
which it is a party. At the same time, it remains
silent on the status of North Korean wives
of Chinese citizens. Although some North
Koreans fall squarely under the definitions of
refugees or trafficking victims, described in the
Refugee Convention or the 2000 Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, especially Women and Children
(hereafter Palermo Protocol), the work of the
UNHCR in Beijing is limited. Only a handful
of cases were solved through the office by
quietly sending North Koreans to neigh-
bouring countries for humanitarian reasons
(Congressional Research Service 2007, p. 11).
It is largely Christian missionaries who ‘save’
North Koreans and smuggle them to China’s
southern neighbouring countries.
The so-called ‘Seoul Train in the Under-
ground Railway’ (see below Map 1) has been
in full operation across China and Southeast
Asian countries since the mid-2000s
(International Crisis Group 2006, p. 14).
Through various financial and physical means,
North Koreans are assisted by their family
members and church networks who hire local
Chinese, Chinese-Korean or even North
Korean brokers. They explore different migra-
tory routes to move North Koreans to the
southern borders of China. They can only do
so by breaking the PRC’s domestic laws (Kim
2010). The PRC authority sees these miss-
ionaries and NGOs as political or sectarian,
anti-communist, anti-DPRK, and ‘Christian
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fundamentalist[s]’ (Seymour 2005, p. 19).
Churches are closely involved in smuggling
North Korean asylum seekers in the name
of God’s humanitarianism (Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea 2008).
NGO workers, Christian missionaries, local
Korean-Chinese and brokers have all played
significant roles in building highly resilient
and secretive underground networks around
North Korean asylum seekers. Their roles are
almost automatically self-organised in a sys-
tematic manner. While NGOs publish advo-
cacy reports in various languages to the
international public (Good Friends, the Inter-
national Crisis Group, Anti-Slavery, Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the
US Committee on Human Rights in North
Korea all produced similar style reports), mis-
sionaries offer shelter, raise funds to pay
brokers who will devise, test-try and establish
escape routes. The fate of North Koreans in
China is in the hands of various private actors
and their interests. Brokers seek financial gain
out of human trafficking and people smuggling
whereas evangelicals have their mission to
spread religious beliefs to North Koreans.
NGOs have humanitarian principles to provide
them with food and shelter. Chosonjok,
Korean-Chinese, sharing the hard-time revolu-
tionary history with North Koreans, have altru-
ism towards North Koreans as well as growing
material interests.
The role of ‘guides’ as facilitators who
create networks, interactions and feedback
loops increases the non-linearity of these
migratory movements. Brokers transform the
nature and patterns of North Korean migration
from human trafficking into people smuggling
and asylum seeking. Some North Koreans
became brokers themselves. P was a former
broker in China who used to smuggle North
Koreans out of the country into the hands of
their families in the South. He is also one of
the first comers to the United Kingdom. He
made his own way to South Korea briefly with
his family and decided to re-migrate to the
Map 1 Seoul Train in the Underground Railway
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United Kingdom in 2008 to settle as a North
Korean refugee, hiding the fact that he had
acquired South Korean citizenship already.
The brokering networks are highly organised;
their roles become varied and specialised like
Adam Smith’s pin factories. The networks of
‘guides’ are so multinational and well funded
by Korean missionaries that one North Korean
from Pyongsong, 20 km northeast of Pyong-
yang, spent only a few days escaping North
Korea through China, Cambodia and Thailand
‘without having one step in dirt, all in wheels’
(Interview with C, a North Korean from
Pyongsong, North Korea, August 2013, New
Malden, UK).
What is clear in the North Korean migrants’
journey in China is that they satisfy the refugee
criteria under international law. However, pro-
tection is denied based on the Chinese priority
on sovereignty, other geopolitical concerns
over the potential mass exodus and bilateral
relations with the DPRK. North Koreans,
therefore, become subject to human trafficking
and vulnerable to other abuses such as undocu-
mented labour migrants.
4. ‘Smuggled Refugees’ in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asian countries offer generally
transit states only for the North Koreans. None
of these countries recognise and accept North
Koreans as refugees. The geopolitical environ-
ments do not guarantee the protection of North
Koreans. In spite of its illegality, people smug-
gling is the only viable option for them to
survive. Approximately 75–90 per cent of
North Koreans are reported to transit through
Southeast Asia en route to South Korea.
The government-funded Korea Institute for
National Unification (KINU) states that
75 per cent of North Koreans who entered
South Korea in 2008 were from Southeast Asia
(KINU 2009). In 2012, this figure went up to
90 per cent. However, no exact numbers were
released. The situation is more complex than
that in China, with added state authorities
with respective interests and identities that are
not always predictable. Missionaries, NGO
workers and brokers still play important roles.
For North Koreans, the transformation from
North Korean citizens to irregular migrants
and to asylum seekers for the enemy state,
South Korea, is an adaptive learning process.
Each country of illegal entry in Southeast
Asia has a distinctive ‘dependence path’ of
Cold War history, diplomatic relations and
material interests with each Korea since the end
of the Second World War (see Table 1 below for
formal diplomatic relations). Various post-Cold
War factors and current defence ties affect the
transit country’s decision to recognise North
Korean irregular migrants. Trade, investment
and developmental aid are becoming more and
more important factor for this decision
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
2005). Humanitarian principles, the media and
international criticism appeal to the conscience
of political elite and civil society that shape the
country’s political and normative identities.
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were the
DPRK’s allies during the Cold War. Over the
past decade, however, the ROK has invested in
development projects in the region and many
South Koreans opened their businesses and fac-
tories there.
Given this unpredictable environment, mis-
sionaries and brokers navigate safer countries
to transit. The following paragraphs are the
author’s annotated interviews with locally
based missionaries and brokers.1 Cambodia is
1. Interviews were conducted in May–June 2013 in
Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai in Thailand during
the author’s own fieldwork research and through telephone
Table 1 Diplomatic Relations between the two
Koreas and Southeast Asia
Country DPRK ROK
Brunei 07/01/1999 01/01/1984
Cambodia 28/02/1964 30/10/1997
Indonesia 16/04/1964 18/09/1973
Laos 24/06/1974 25/10/1995
Malaysia 02/07/1973 26/02/1960
Burma/Myanmar 16/05/1975 16/05/1975
Philippines 12/07/2000 03/03/1949
Singapore 08/11/1975 07/08/1975
Thailand 08/05/1975 01/10/1958
Vietnam 30/01/1950 22/12/1992
Note: The red shading means countries having longer
diplomatic relations with the DPRK; the blue shading
means countries having longer diplomatic relations with
the ROK.
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one of the two countries in Southeast Asia that
are party to the Refugee Convention. However,
it does not accept North Koreans as refugees.
Cambodia is used only after transiting Laos as
it is not geographically adjacent to China.
Burma/Myanmar, although bordering with
China, is also geographically challenging
because of the rough mountain landscape
along the borders. It is also not safe because
there are civil conflicts at the margins of
Burma/Myanmar and the military govern-
ment’s ceasefire agreements with local rebel
groups are still being negotiated. According to
an NGO report in 2006, the Burmese authori-
ties, however, did not prevent North Koreans
from entering the ROK Embassy in Yangon
(International Crisis Group 2006, p. 23).
In July 2004, Vietnam, one of the Cold-War
allies of North Korea, decided to send 468
North Korean asylum seekers via a chartered
Korean airline to South Korea. On this deci-
sion, the Vietnamese government publicly
stated that it would comply with ‘Vietnamese
laws, international law and practices in
humanitarian spirit’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Vietnam 2004). This episode created
diplomatic tensions with the DPRK, which
recalled its ambassador to Pyongyang. The
Vietnam route has not been much used since
this incident, at least publicly.
Laos, being the most commonly used route
before Thailand, charges ‘fines’ or ‘diplomatic
fees’ for releasing North Korean border-
crossers (International Crisis Group 2006, p.
21). A number of sources identified that China-
Laos-Thailand route has been the most popular
one among brokers (an interview with P in
London in July 2013 confirmed this route).
According to Chu Song Ha, a former North
Korean and now South Korean journalist of
DongA Daily, around 800 North Koreans
reportedly transited through Laos to South
Korea in 2009. Chu, however, did not identify
where the number was from. In many news
reports concerning North Korean defectors, the
sources are unidentified and therefore unverifi-
able and unreliable. In 2009, the total number of
North Koreans who arrived in South Korea was
2,929 (Ministry of Unification 2015). As the
number went up, the Laotian authority raised
the fees from US$200 to US$400 per head if a
North Korean wishes to seek refuge in Laos
(interview with two missionaries, C and K,
based in Laos in July 2013 via telephone). If a
migrant only wants to transit through Laos to
other countries, the fees are only US$50. Thai-
land is often used as North Koreans’ last transit
point before South Korea as it does not deport
North Koreans to North Korea for humanitarian
reasons. The Thai authority imposes a fine of
THB 2,000–6,000 (approximately US$187) or
10–30 days imprisonment in a local prison for
illegal entry. These figures are suggested by a
Bangkok-based South Korean missionary who
has been helping North Koreans smuggled in
from China. In contrast, at the Chiang Rai
immigration court, cited in the 2006 report of
the International Crisis Group, declared the
penalty for illegal entry to be US$53 or 5 days
in jail (2006, p. 22).
The roles of international law and interna-
tional organisations have been questioned
(Chan & Schloenhardt 2007) and they are of
little help in smuggling cases. Laos and Thai-
land are not parties to the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention, and therefore are under no obligations
to offer asylum for North Koreans. PRC and
Cambodia are parties but they do not fully
comply with international humanitarian or
human rights principles. The UNHCR itself
defines North Korean asylum seekers in China
and Thailand as ‘persons of concern’, not refu-
gees (UNHCR 2015). In 2006, the then High
Commissioner António Guterres, on his visit to
Thailand, even understated that the situation
was not ‘dramatic, compared to other parts of
the world’ at a press conference in Bangkok
(Kyodo News 2006). The International Crisis
Group (2006, p. 21), on the other hand, identi-
fies North Koreans in Thailand as ‘smuggled
migrants’.
The illegality of their movements deters
many from human rights approaches to North
and emails. Other journalistic and NGO reports are also
consolidated for further information. As stated in the intro-
duction, personal accounts from missionaries, brokers and
North Koreans are often not reliable, which is the biggest
obstacle for this research. To overcome this difficulty, the
author uses multiple sources of information from different
locations.
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Korean migrants. I would like to highlight that
the forms of North Korean irregular migration
is highly mixed: there are trafficked refugees
or trafficked undocumented labourers in China
and smuggled refugees in Thailand or Laos.
The term, ‘smuggled refugees’, indicates that
they are not refugees defined by international
law but become refugees when they are suc-
cessfully smuggled (Song 2013). When they
reach Bangkok through smuggling, they can
finally seek protection and refuge by the ROK
government or a third country. One needs to
note that North Koreans are not refugees under
the ROK laws. ROK does not recognise the
DPRK as a separate state (and vice versa)
although they have been separate UN member
states since 1991. The ROK also claims the
entire Korean peninsula as its sovereign terri-
tory. According to this constitutional interpre-
tation, therefore, North Koreans are also South
Koreans whom the ROK government should
protect. North Korea, of course, denies this
argument and insists that those North Koreans
are illegal border-crossers and subsequently
kidnapped by South Korean missionaries and
some covert intelligence officers sent from
Seoul, and therefore should be returned to the
country of origin.
North Koreans flee from basic personal,
political, economic, food, health and environ-
ment insecurities back home. They are not pro-
tected by China as China is not a party to the
1951 Refugee Convention. They are buck-
passed by Laos, tolerated by Thailand, and left
in the hands of brokers and Christian mission-
aries until the former reach the ROK embassies
in Southeast Asia. These private actors who see
themselves as heroes are in fact outlaws or
human traffickers from the transit countries’ or
the DPRK’s point of view. One former North
Korean broker notes that ‘I consider myself a
hero who has saved many lives. I cannot be a
good citizen and abide by laws when these laws
are made by bad guys’. Although the major
roles in smuggling are played by brokers, North
Koreans themselves develop personal agency
along their perilous journeys through China and
Southeast Asia through interactions with other
private actors and adapting their endogenous
survival skills to new environments.
5. Fungible Identities: North or South
Korean?
Myron Weiner (1994, p. 11) identifies the
threats refugees may pose to a hosting society:
(i) in worsening relations between sending and
receiving countries; (ii) as a political threat or
security risk to the regime of the host country;
(iii) as a cultural threat; (iv) causing socio-
economic problems; and (v) when the host
society uses refugees as an instrument of threat
against the country of origin. All of these
matter to South Korea from a state-centric
view. There is a loophole in the system where
North Korean secret agents can infiltrate
through ‘smuggled refugee’ routes from
Southeast Asia and it is an existential threat to
national security. The mass acceptance of
North Koreans has been a politically driven
policy that was designed to undermine and
challenge the North Korean regime and to
grow anti-DPRK factions in South Korea. It is
also a hugely expensive policy for both North
Koreans and South Korean taxpayers as the
former have to pay brokers the ‘defection fees’
and the latter’s tax goes to the settlement pro-
grammes for North Koreans. The cost for one
North Korean defector to arrive in South
Korea, gathered from the online newspapers
and personal interviews, is between KRW
2.5 million to 10 million (approximately
US$2,000–8,000). If 25,000 North Koreans
(as of December 2013, 26,124 North Korean
residents in South Korea) needed on average
US$3,500, for example, this amounts to
US$87.5 million. Receiving a large number of
refugees comes with costs, not just financially
but politically as well.
In 2006–2011, the number of North Koreans
entering South Korea has been more than
2,000 annually. The total number of North
Koreans living in South Korea is 25,329 as of
2012 (see Figure 1) (Ministry of Unification).
This figure is marginal, given South Korea’s
50 million population or even North Korea’s
25 million (World Bank 2014). Despite the
small number, national security concerns grew
among South Koreans as there were several
‘spy’ cases. According to South Korea’s con-
servative right-wing newspaper, Choson Ilbo
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(2010), two North Korean spies infiltrated
South Korea through Thailand in 2010. They
attempted to assassinate Hwang Jang Yup, the
highest ranking North Korean defector who
fled to the ROK through the Philippines in
1997. Another well-publicised case is the con-
victed female spy, Won Chong Hwa, who was
believed to have orders from the North to
seduce military officers who then could leak
information about the South’s military defence
systems (Shin Dong A 2014).
However, this national security perspective
misrepresents the general North Korean com-
munity in South Korea. The forementioned
few spy cases are exceptional and most North
Korean residents are ordinary working class
people. They acquire South Korean citizenship
after the screening investigation by the ROK
National Intelligence Service and the resettle-
ment programme by the Ministry of Unifica-
tion for 3 months. North Koreans become
South Koreans but cannot fully integrate into
the society. Many North Koreans, including
those I interviewed in London and Seoul, say
they went through identify confusion, if not
crisis, while trying to adapt to the new envi-
ronment in South Korea (Yoon & Lim 2007).
Many expressed that they had faced numerous
difficulties in adjusting to the highly competi-
tive capitalist society. Their settlement ben-
efits are enough to get by but not enough to
enter the mainstream South Korean society.
Their foreign language and computer skills
are far below that of average South Koreans.
Many experience discrimination against their
origin in schools and workplaces. The sensa-
tional spy cases can result in arbitrary search
and arrest of any suspected North Koreans.
Some North Koreans in South Korea do not
have access to basic income because of inad-
equate support for North Koreans who lack
basic vocational skills. Those who receive
subsistence benefits is still high at 35 per cent
in 2013, but down from 63.5 per cent in 2007
(Ministry of Unification 2015). They also
suffer from post-traumatic symptoms affected
by their perilous journeys in China and
Southeast Asia (Jeon et al. 2013). In August
2013, surprising statistics were released from
the Ministry of Unification. Among approxi-
Figure 1 Annual Arrivals of North Koreans in South Korea
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mately 25,000 North Korean residents in
South Korea, there are 26 suicides, 583
deaths, 51 emigrants and 796 missing
(Yonhap News 2013b). South Korea is known
as the highest suicide rate among all member
states of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development at 31.2 in
every 100,000 in 2012. Among North
Koreans, it is 124, four times higher than
South Koreans.
The politics of jealousy and competition for
resources begin as the number of North
Koreans grows in South Korea. Settlement
fees, free public housing, and incentives for
education and employment provided for
North Koreans have created tensions between
North Koreans and other working-class South
Koreans or low-income chosonjok labour
migrants. Negative images of North Korean
feature in the main news media about their
alleged violent behaviour, fraud, laziness, high
dependency and gender bias (Yonhap News
2013a). At the same time, many North Koreans
become disillusioned about South Korea.
Many I interviewed in 2012–2014 expressed
that all they wanted was ‘not to be identified a
person from North Korea’.
North Koreans in South Korea are not refu-
gees due to the special inter-Korean relations.
The Korean War did not end with a peace
treaty but with an armistice. Technically, the
two Koreas are still at war; neither side has
won the war yet. The official title given to
North Koreans in South Korea has been
changed over the past decades. Until late
1980s, they were named ‘returnees to submit’
(kuisuncha). Later, they were called ‘North
Korean defectors’ (talbukcha), ‘North Korean
defectors-residents’ (bukhan yital chumin) or
‘new settlers’ (setomin): North Korean resi-
dents in South Korea call South Koreans
‘bontomin’, which means original settlers.
North Koreans become South Koreans with
North Korea as their origin of birth, having
distinctive identity from other South Koreans,
which creates inclusion and exclusion as well
as new motivations to re-migrate to another
country.
Although most human security conditions
have significantly improved for North Koreans
who acquired South Korean citizenship, they
suffer from greater economic insecurity and
feel discriminated against by their fellow South
Koreans. With the absence of a peace treaty
after the 1953 Korean War, both South and
North Koreans are insecure about their personal
and political securities. This has been invisible
hindrance to peace and security in the Korean
peninsula whether Koreans feel it or not.
6. Re-Migration to the West
When the numbers of North Korean asylum
seekers in the United Kingdom in 2006–2008
were released, many North Korea watchers,
including myself, were deeply puzzled. It
amounted to 602 asylum applications in 2007.
Considering that the direct routes from North
Korea to the United Kingdom were neither
easily accessible nor comprehensible, the
author’s immediate suspicion was either that
they were not North Koreans or that they came
from South Korea. It did not take long to find
out that many of those North Korean refugees
had not come directly from North Korea but
transited through various countries in EastAsia,
including China, Thailand, Laos and South
Korea through interviews with members of the
Korean community in the United Kingdom,
mainly in New Malden, the biggest Korean
community in Europe. For many South
Koreans and especially the government of the
Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), it
was embarrassing to learn that the majority of
the North Koreans, who claimed their refugee
status in the United Kingdom, had already
settled and resided in South Korea. More
alarmingly, perhaps for the UK authorities, a
half of the granted North Korean refugees were
reported to be chosonjok (Korean-Chinese), not
North Korean (Radio Free Asia 2012). The
Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
reported that 258 out of 415 North Korean
asylum applicants in the United Kingdom in
2007 were suspected to be Chinese nationals
(Song 2012).
Over the past decade, the United Kingdom
and Canada have been the two most popular
destination countries for North Koreans.
Table 2 shows that there was a stark increase in
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the number of North Korean applicants who
sought refuge in the United Kingdom from 61
in 2006 to 602 in 2007. The number dropped to
56 in 2009. At the same time, the rejection rate
increased from the lowest 7.4 per cent in 2007
to 80.1 per cent in 2010.
When granted the refugee status, North
Koreans were allocated council housing in
major cities of the United Kingdom. However,
many of them relocated to New Malden, the
biggest Korea Town in Europe where they
could work and use social networks of other
Koreans, both from North and South Korea.
They formed the UK North Korean Residents
Society in New Malden in May 2008 and have
actively involved various political events
regarding North Korea. Most North Koreans
who came to the United Kingdom had already
settled in South Korea and become South
Korean citizens who could then travel to the
United Kingdom, visa-free for 6 months.
Guided by the information circulated within
families and social networks, they sought
refuge and subsequently were granted refugee
status. Some have already acquired permanent
resident status in the United Kingdom.2
This phenomenon is not unique to North
Korean asylum seeking. Similar patterns of
behaviour have been labelled as ‘bogus’ refu-
gees in the migration literature (Neumayer
2005; Diez 2011; Zimmermann 2011;
Stefanova 2014; Stewart & Mulvey 2014). The
main reasons for their secondary migration
identified during my interviews were social
discrimination in South Korea (push factor)
and children’s education in more developed
English-speaking Western countries with gen-
erous welfare packages (pull factors). A female
North Korean in her 40s says: ‘it’s ok to be
discriminated against here because there are
many second-class or third-class citizens like
those black people. But, in South Korea, I
couldn’t bear the second-class citizen treat-
ments from fellow Koreans. It’s so humiliat-
ing’. What is more important than the linear
push-pull factors is the facilitating factor by
social networks, formed in the rehabilitation
centre, called Hanawon under the ROK Min-
istry of Unification. During the 3-month resi-
dential programme, North Koreans share
information about living in South Korea and
possible secondary migration destinations.
They compare benefits systems and recent
success rates. Many parents choose English-
speaking countries for their children’s educa-
tion. The United Kingdom meets all of these
conditions.
There is a danger that the topic of North
Korean refugees may be focused on the illegal-
ity of their movements (Radio Free Asia 2014).
The causes and motivations of their 20 years of
irregular migration should receive adequate
attention from a human security perspective.
North Koreans left their homes due to personal,
political, economic, food, health and environ-
mental insecurities since the beginning of mul-
tiple natural disasters, followed by famine and
malnutrition in the 1990s. Many in China were
trafficked. Some were ‘saved’ by missionaries.
Others smuggled. As of 2012, 25,329 North
Koreans live in South Korea (Ministry of Uni-
fication 2013). Many feel the harsh reality of
difficult social integration and discrimination
based on their place of birth, especially for the
second generation of North Koreans who were
born and raised in South Korea. The perception
about North Koreans in South Korea is double
edged. On the one hand, they are seen as help-
less victims of the repressive regime under the
Kim family and therefore in need of help and
assistance, which is often unilaterally evaluated
and implemented. On the other, the settlement
benefits and affirmative actions under the Law
on the Protection and Settlement for North
Korean Defectors is often seen as excessive by
ordinary working-class South Koreans.3
2. In July–August 2012 and again in July–August 2013,
the author visited New Malden and Kingston upon
Thames where North Korean residents have formed a
community and interviewed North Koreans, both asylum
seekers and residents.
3. In a series of fieldwork interviews with South Korean
researchers working on North Korea at Dongkuk Univer-
sity, Seoul National University and the Korea Institute for
National Unification (KINU) in May 2014, a number of
them raised concerns about the growing social conflicts
between North Korean residents and lower-middle class
South Koreans. There are many ‘North Koreans only’
social or educational services that South Koreans cannot
enjoy. For example, Y, a PhD student from a middle-
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North Koreans have figured out a loophole
in the UK refugee system which has allowed
many Korean-Chinese and, to a larger extent,
North Korean residents in South Korea to
receive refugee status with faked identities.4
There is a long waiting time before a decision
is made whether or not to accept a refugee.
Young South Korean passport holders with
North Korean parents go to visa-free countries
for South Koreans, and claim refuge. While
the final decisions are being processed, they
are offered housing and language services.
Some take this as an English language training
experience. Even though the refugee applica-
tions are rejected, they gain free English lan-
guage education offered by refugee services.5
There is no system in place to check the appli-
cants’ age if they do not present any verifiable
IDs. Those who claim to be underaged or
elderly may receive additional protection and
benefits from host governments. Of course,
this does not represent the North Korean com-
munities in the United Kingdom or Canada.
However, a significant portion of the commu-
nities show this trend and behaviour based on
the author’s own interviews and other ongoing
research projects on the topic.6
There are also the inherent structural Cold
War problems still lingering in the Korean
peninsula. The 1950–1953 Korean War did not
end. It paused with an armistice and, therefore,
two Koreas are still at war and Koreans, both
in North and South, have live in prolonged
armed conflict for more than 60 years. This is
a fundamental threat to human security for
everyone living in the Korean peninsula.
While it may be a legal issue to determine a
person’s refugee status, the dual nationality
argument is at odds with the temporary nature
of the truce that was signed by both Koreas and
the UN, headed by the United States. North
Koreans who fled North Korea to live in South
Korea realise the only way to be safer and
secure from these prolonged armed conflicts is
to flee to another country.
North Korean secondary migrants to the
United Kingdom have diverse backgrounds,
motivations, migratory experiences or local
adaptation, having to go through in China,
Southeast Asian countries and South Korea.
There is a varying degree in each migrant’s
exposure to personal, community, political,
economic, food, health and environmental
insecurities. The refugee decision should be
based on the person’s individual life events
and accessible resources, not a person’s
nationality or the immediate sending country’s
protection standards. For example, a North
Korean woman in her 50s lodged a refugee
claim to join her elder brother and his family
who had successfully settled in the United
Kingdom as refugees (Interview with P in
London in July 2013). She had no means of
survival in South Korea; no skills that are
required in modern high-tech South Korea
and no friends or families to rely on. Her
brother hired a broker to escape her from
North Korea, through China, Laos and Cam-
bodia, to South Korea. She stayed in South
Korea only for a few months only to
re-migrate to join her brother in the United
income family saw an advertisement about free English
language lessons in the campus. She called the organiser
and heard that the programme was open for North Koreans
only and she was not qualified. The North Koreans,
however, according to her, all received government schol-
arships and had their college education almost for free.
Some North Koreans ‘disappear’ to the United Kingdom
or Canada and come back with good English, she said.
4. The author’s own confidential interviews in London in
2012–2014 verify that there are at least dozens of Korean-
Chinese who were granted refugee status from the UK
government.
5. Interview with C, a North Korean resident in her early
20s who went to Canada to claim refuge for this reason in
November 2012. Her application was rejected and she
returned to South Korea in April 2013. According to her,
there were five to six others who were all North Korean
youth with South Korean passports in the same shelter she
stayed, operated by first-comer North Koreans.
6. The KINU has been sending their teams to investigate
the issue since 2010. The Institute for Peace and Unifica-
tion Studies of Seoul National University published a
report in 2012 on North Korean diaspora. A team from
Yonsei University has written an internal confidential
report on North Korean refugee claims in major Western
countries for the Ministry of Unification in 2012 or 2013,
which is not available to public view as of June 2014. An
ambitious anthropological PhD research that includes
live-in experience with North Korean refugees in New
Malden by Chung Soo Min from the University of Oxford
has been ongoing since 2010.
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Kingdom. Her application was rejected in
April 2013 and she faced removal.
7. Conclusion
This study adds a human security perspective
to the existing literature on North Korean
migration in particular and irregular migration
in general. What can be inferred from the
current case study is that irregular migration,
i.e. trafficking in persons, undocumented
labour migration, asylum seeking and people
smuggling, takes a mixed form and it is best
understood by looking at both the migrants’
exogenous human security conditions and
inner motivations. What has turned out to be
most important is their interactions with other
key agents in the system such as missionaries
and brokers. In China, many women were ini-
tially trafficked. Some become undocumented
labour migrants while others move on to
neighbouring countries by paying brokers. In
Southeast Asia, if their assisted smuggling is
successful, they become refugees. In South
Korea, North Koreans are officially accepted
as South Koreans.
Another aspect that can be drawn from this
study is that the nature of irregular migrants
evolves over time through their journeys. In
case of North Korean migrants, they develop
from helpless victims to independent agents
through their accumulated experiences and
interactions with other actors under the chang-
ing geo-political structure and regional envi-
ronments over the past two decades. In the first
instance, North Koreans are victims of repres-
sive undemocratic regimes that do not respect
the right to freedom of movement or to seek
refuge under international law. They learn to
make full use of all the available resources
they have in China and Southeast Asia from
missionaries. To varying degrees, each indi-
vidual North Korean operates with basic sur-
vival instinct to protect his or her human
security and enhances this through learning,
sharing and adaptation. North Koreans keep
moving across fragile borders with fungible
identities. They can act the part of refugee in
freer and more secure countries like the United
Kingdom or Canada. This self-organising
behaviour is not planned in advance but con-
stituted through interactions with others during
their long migratory journeys. Such migratory
patterns are non-linear and unpredictable as
we do not know when, where and how feed-
back loops and networks are created to lead to
a next migration destination.
What we learn from this dynamic migration
process is that the role of non-state actors is
among the most critical factor while state
actors are merely responsive or retroactive.
NGOs and Christian missionaries’ involve-
ment in smuggling, such as paying for brokers
and bribing security officers, raises some
serious moral questions. They strengthen
illegal smuggling networks across China and
Southeast Asia while leaving the majority of
North Koreans who cannot hire brokers in a
more vulnerable condition. They undermine
global anti-corruption movements for the sake
of saving North Koreans (or achieving their
religious mission), underestimate complex
geopolitical contexts in the region, and ironi-
cally contribute to sustaining the North Korean
economy by remittance.
The main argument for this article is that the
main driver of irregular migration is the quest to
improve human security (see Table 3). This
hypothesis can be applied to other irregular
migration cases. North Koreans move from less
secure and less democratic countries (the
DPRK and the PRC) to more secure ones (the
ROK or the United Kingdom). South Korea
protects basic human security in terms of food,
health and environment. However, it still has
many challenging issues such as discriminatory
policies and practices regarding basic income
Table 3 Human Security and North Korean
Migration
DPRK PRC SEA ROK UK
Personal
Community
Political
Economic
Food
Health
Environment
0 1.5 0.5 5.5 6.5
The blue shading means secure (1); the yellow shading
means medium (0.5); the red shadings means insecure (0).
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and socio-political freedom based on national
origin or birth. The ROK policy of inducing
North Koreans (to flee to South Korea) and its
unrealistic territorial definition in the state’s
constitution result from the prolonged armed
conflict on the Korean peninsula. The United
Kingdom is a democratic welfare state that
better protects personal and economic securi-
ties. Not everyone survives in these complex
evolutionary processes. Only those with strong
self-organising and adaptive skills do. Many
must have vanished along the way.As ofAugust
2013, around 26,000 North Koreans live in
South Korea and at least 796 are missing and
believed to be overseas claiming refuge. To call
this natural selection might sound politically
irresponsible; however, for the survival and
reproduction of North Koreans, their continu-
ous search for new migration destinations is a
natural phenomenon. Survival and adaptation
are basic instincts of the North Korean migrants
that are not much different from those observed
in the natural world. What policy makers and
migration experts should be reminded of is that
humans are purposeful beings with con-
sciences, and that irregular migration, regard-
less of its illegality, must be approached from a
human security perspective, not a state-centric
one.
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